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Abstract
Background: The Iowa gambling task is a popular test for examining monetary decision behavior
under uncertainty. According to Dunn et al. review article, the difficult-to-explain phenomenon of
"prominent deck B" was revealed, namely that normal decision makers prefer bad final-outcome
deck B to good final-outcome decks C or D. This phenomenon was demonstrated especially clearly
by Wilder et al. and Toplak et al. The "prominent deck B" phenomenon is inconsistent with the
basic assumption in the IGT; however, most IGT-related studies utilized the "summation" of bad
decks A and B when presenting their data, thereby avoiding the problems associated with deck B.
Methods: To verify the "prominent deck B" phenomenon, this study launched a two-stage simple
version IGT, namely, an AACC and BBDD version, which possesses a balanced gain-loss structure
between advantageous and disadvantageous decks and facilitates monitoring of participant
preferences after the first 100 trials.
Results: The experimental results suggested that the "prominent deck B" phenomenon exists in
the IGT. Moreover, participants cannot suppress their preference for deck B under the uncertain
condition, even during the second stage of the game. Although this result is incongruent with the
basic assumption in IGT, an increasing number of studies are finding similar results. The results of
the AACC and BBDD versions can be congruent with the decision literatures in terms of gain-loss
frequency.
Conclusion: Based on the experimental findings, participants can apply the "gain-stay, loss-shift"
strategy to overcome situations involving uncertainty. This investigation found that the largest loss
in the IGT did not inspire decision makers to avoid choosing bad deck B.
Background
Over the past few years, Damasio's [1] Somatic Marker
Hypothesis (SMH) has become a central argument in
affective neuroscience [2-7] and has also garnered increas-
ing attention from neuroeconomists [8-10]. Bechara,
Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson, [11] proposed the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) as a means of sustaining the
SMH. These studies of Iowa group claimed that the supe-
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riority of normal decision makers over patients with emo-
tional deficits in IGT results from the intact somatic
marker [1,12-16]. Damasio suggested that:
"...the brains of the normal subjects were gradually learning to
predict a bad outcome, and were signaling the relative badness
of the particular deck before the actual card-turning. "([1], p
220).
The IGT has four decks, namely, decks A, B, C, and D.
Decks A and B cause participants to lose $ 250 on average
during the course of ten trials; furthermore, the gains or
losses made during each trial when using these decks are
comparatively large. Conversely, decks C and D cause par-
ticipants to win $ 250 on average over ten trials; moreo-
ver, these two decks involve comparatively small
immediate gains or losses during each trial. In the gain-
loss frequency dimension of the original thinking of
Bechara, decks A and C both have balanced gain-loss fre-
quency (5 gains and 5 losses); moreover, decks B and D
have identical high-frequency gain and low-frequency
loss (9 gains and 1 loss) (see Table 1). The Iowa gambling
task contains different long-term outcomes in advanta-
geous decks (C, D) and disadvantageous decks (A, B), and
a counterbalancing of other variables. In some trials, par-
ticipants experience one gain and one loss within a trial.
Participants complete 100 trials blind to the game end.
Bechara et al. [11] and Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio,
[17] also loaded the IGT with many variables to generate
an uncertain situation and prevent decision makers from
using logic to reason. The following introduction for par-
ticipants was adopted from the original IGT study and
explains how the task simulates the uncertainty in real-life
decisions:
"...The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible
and, if you find yourself unable to win, make sure you avoid los-
ing money as much as possible. I won't tell you for how long the
game will continue. You must keep on playing until the compu-
ter stops. ... It is important to know that the colors of the cards
are irrelevant in this game. The computer does not make you
lose money at random. However, there is no way for you to fig-
ure out when the computer will make you lose. All I can say is
that you may find yourself losing money on all of the decks, but
some decks will make you lose more than others. You can win
if you stay away from the worst decks." ([18], p. 5474, 5475).
Bechara et al. [11,17] proposed that participants facing
uncertainty are sensitive to long-term outcome with the
assistance of somatic markers. As demonstrated by the
studies of the Iowa group, decision makers obtain long-
term benefits by gradually shifting their deck of choice
from A and B to C and D, but this behavior is reversed for
affective deficits.
Following careful review of IGT-related studies, it is worth
emphasizing that some studies have compared the advan-
tages and disadvantages of decks. Most studies only
present data in an advantageous-disadvantageous format
or subtract the mean numbers of choices for decks A and
B from that for decks C and D [9,14,18-23]. Nevertheless,
such presentation methods allow these researchers to dis-
regard the detailed differences among the four decks. Per-
haps, these methods are easier to avoid the difficult
problem of "prominent deck B", which indicates that par-
ticipants prefer deck B to the other three decks. However,
this phenomenon is difficult to identify – most IGT-rele-
vant studies utilized the summation of advantageous
decks (C+D) or disadvantageous decks (A+B) in present-
Table 1: The gain-loss structure in the original IGT.
Deck
Card Sequence
ABCD
11 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
21 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
31 0 0 ,   -150 100 50, -50 50
41 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
51 0 0 ,   -300 100 50,-50 50
61 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
71 0 0 ,   -200 100 50, -50 50
81 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
91 0 0 ,   -250 100, -1250 50, -50 50
10 100, -350 100 50, -50 50, -250
Final Outcomes -250 ($) -250 ($) +250 ($) +250 ($)
Gain-loss Frequency 5 gains
5 losses
9 gains
1 loss
5 gains
5 losses
9 gains
1 lossBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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ing their experimental results. Consequently, these exper-
imental results will not contradict the basic assumption in
IGT.
Conversely, Crone and van der Molen, [22,24] observed
that the immediate reward directly influences participants
during the IGT. That is, participants choose decks with
high-frequency gains more frequently than those with
low-frequency gains. They suggested that local choices of
decision makers are guided by high-frequency gain and
low-frequency loss, and concluded that long-term out-
come ultimately dominates participant decisions.
Based on the basic IGT assumption, deck B has a disad-
vantageous long-term outcome that should gradually
cause decision makers to avoid it owing to its relatively
"large losses" (see Table 1). A growing number of studies
utilized a four-deck format and showed that numerous
participants prefer deck B to A [25-28]. Additionally, deck
B is occasionally chosen more often than the advanta-
geous decks C or D in the original IGT. Dunn et al. [7]
conducted a meta-study of IGT studies and observed that
normal participants and affective patients preferred decks
B and D to decks A and C in certain studies [29-32]. Par-
ticularly, Toplak, Jain, and Tannock, [33] showed that
deck B was chosen more than the other three decks not
only by the patient group but also by the normal control.
Notably, these five (out of over 100) studies all utilized
the four-deck format to measure IGT performance. These
studies thus have the opportunity to observe which were
inconsistent with the expectations of Iowa group. When
the "prominent deck B" phenomenon applies, short-
sighted behavior can also be observed by normal decision
makers under the uncertain situation.
However, to date few studies have directly observed the
"prominent deck B" phenomenon and examined it
empirically. This study thus attempts to determine
whether the "prominent deck B" phenomenon exists in
the IGT. If deck B is preferred by most participants, the
basic assumption of IGT may need to be refined. Mean-
while, if most decision makers avoid deck B, there may be
some confounding of the data not only of Toplak et al. but
also of the other four studies [29-32], demonstrating that
the "prominent deck B" phenomenon needs to be recon-
sidered.
This investigation utilizes a two-stage simplified version
of the IGT [22,24] – namely: the AACC and BBDD ver-
sions of the IGT – to identify participant preferences. The
simple design separates the frequent-gain decks (B, D)
from frequent-loss decks (A, C), while retaining all uncer-
tainty conditions of the original IGT.
Based on the basic assumption in the IGT [11,17], partic-
ipants should be sensitive to long-term outcome in this
simplified version of the IGT. Restated, decks C and D
should be chosen more frequently than decks A and B in
both this simplified version of the IGT and in the original
IGT. Prior to the original version of IGT, this study added
one further session (comprising an additional 100 trials)
to identify participant sensitivity to long-term outcome in
the second stage of the simple version IGT. If participants
are sensitive to long-term outcome, decks A and B are cho-
sen less often than decks C and D during stages 1 and 2 of
the simple version IGT. Meanwhile, if participants are
insensitive to long-term outcome they will choose decks A
and B as often as (or more often than) they choose decks
C and D, particularly during stage 2.
Materials and methods
This work enrolled 48 adults, mostly college and graduate
students. Participants were divided into two groups: 24
participants, 12 males and 12 females, (Mean age: 22.96
years old, SD: 1.92 years) received the AACC version; and
24 participants, 12 males and 12 females, (Mean age:
23.04 years old, SD: 2.33 years) received the BBDD ver-
sion. Each participant performed only one set of balanced
card positions (such as, AACC, ACCA, ACAC, CCAA,
CAAC, and CACA) to preclude the position effect; that is,
each position arrangement (see Figure 1) was performed
by four participants (2 males and 2 females). Addition-
ally, each participant performed the game twice and their
preferences during the first and second stages were traced.
After completing the first stage, each participant immedi-
ately completed a questionnaire to indicate their prefer-
ences. In the two-stage design, participants were informed
that they were totally free to choose the decks and that
there were no time limitations in playing the game. Partic-
ipants performed the second run immediately following
the completion of the first session game and question-
naire. Furthermore, participants were informed that the
second game was played had the same internal rules as the
first game.
Results
The results indicated that the participants preferred deck C
in both stages of AACC version (stage 1: t (23) = -4.76, p
< .01 (two-tailed); stage 2: t (23) = -5.39, p < .01 (two-
tailed)) (Figure 2). Furthermore, the two-factor (2 decks ×
5 blocks) ANOVA (repeated measurement) was applied to
test the data of each of the two stages separately. The par-
ticipants shifted their preference from deck A to deck C at
the beginning of the AACC version of IGT and entered the
steady state before the end of stage 1. During stage 2, par-
ticipants consistently selected deck C (stage 1: F (1, 23) =
22.68, p < .01; stage 2: F (1, 23) = 38.02, p < .01) (Figure
3). The descending curve of deck A and ascending curve of
deck C indicated that participants can progressively shiftBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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Counterbalance of deck position in the simplified IGT Figure 1
Counterbalance of deck position in the simplified IGT. The figure showed a flowchart regarding the generation of the 
AACC and BBDD versions from the original IGT and rearranged them to produce six compositions in the AACC and BBDD 
versions to counterbalance the position effect. Each composition was performed by two male and two female adults to control 
the gender effect.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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their choice to deck C, especially during the second stage,
a phenomenon that is never demonstrated by other IGT
related studies.
In the BBDD version, participants exhibited equal prefer-
ences for decks B and D (stage 1: t (23) = -0.27, p = .78
(two-tailed); stage 2: t (23) = -0.79, p = .43 (two-tailed))
(Figure 4). The testing was performed using a two-factor
(2 decks × 5 blocks) repeated measurement ANOVA. The
data disclosed the inadequacy of interpreting the result of
IGT based on long-term outcome. Even during the second
stage, participants retained their preference for decks B
and D (stage 1: F (1, 23) = 0.08, p = .78; stage 2: F (1, 23)
= 0.64, p = .43) (Figure 5). The learning state curve dem-
onstrated that participants less shifted their preference
from deck B (disadvantageous deck) to deck D (advanta-
geous deck). The two decks appear equally attractive for
most participants, lasting from the beginning of the first
stage through to the end of the second stage. Question-
naire data confirmed that participants preferred deck C to
deck A (t (23) = -2.62, p < .05 (two-tailed)), and their pref-
erence for deck B almost matched that for D at the end of
the first stage (t (23) = 0.06, p = .95 (two-tailed)) (Figure
6). In advance, the result of the final money amount
which is related to final subject state of this game is also
consistent with the previous observations regarding
choice behavior. Most participants obtained positive final
outcomes during both stages (stage 1: 20/24 participants
win; stage 2: 21/24 participants win) of the AACC version.
However, in the BBDD version, most decision makers
obtained the final state loss not only during the first stage,
but also during the second stage (stage 1: 3/24 partici-
Mean number of cards selection in blocks Figure 3
Mean number of cards selection in blocks. The 2-stage preference curves of decks A and C. Participants preferred deck 
C to deck A at the beginning and this choice pattern lasted until the end of stage 2.
Mean number of cards selection Figure 2
Mean number of cards selection. This figure illustrates 
the mean number of card selections between decks A and C 
with a summation for each stage. The mean of deck C is 
higher than that of deck A in both stages.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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pants win; stage 2: 7/24 participants win) (see Table 2).
Mean amount of final gain-loss indicated that most sub-
jects win money in both stages of the AACC version, while
in the BBDD version, most participants lose money after
stages 1 and 2.
Discussion
The outcome of applying the AACC version is consistent
with the basic assumption in the IGT regarding the long-
term outcome. Following 20 trials of the game, partici-
pants began shifting their preference to deck C. According
to the suggestion of Damasio, participants seemed to
identify the future consequences of each deck earlier than
in the original IGT. The experimental result for the AACC
version is consistent with the basic assumption in the IGT.
However, contrary to the experimental results obtained by
Bechara et al., the results for the BBDD version are not
congruent with the basic assumption in the IGT. In the
BBDD version, the intact somatic marker appears not to
fully guide participants to avoid deck B (bad long-term
outcome) and choose deck D (good long-term outcome).
The experimental data from stage 1 confirms that decision
makers are insensitive in regards to long-term outcome
and may be driven by other factors. In fact, decks B and D
have different long-term outcomes (Table 1), but both
decks possessed the same power to guide selection behav-
Mean number of cards selection in blocks Figure 5
Mean number of cards selection in blocks. The learning curves for decks B and D in both stages indicate that participants 
were unaware of long-term outcome throughout stage 2. No significant differences existed between the two decks and 
between blocks.
Mean number of cards selection Figure 4
Mean number of cards selection. Experimental results 
indicated that decision makers have almost the same mean 
number of cards in decks B and D in stages 1 and 2. Notably, 
participants seemed unaware of the "largest loss" in deck B 
during both stages.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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ior. According to the observation in the BBDD version,
participants cannot hunch the final outcome in the long
run.
To further verify the "prominent deck B" phenomenon,
which implies that participants cannot make hunches
regarding long-term outcomes or inability to avoid select-
ing the bad deck, a two-stage design was adopted for each
participant. After completing both stages (200 trials), par-
ticipants had experienced the IGT twice. Experimental
results demonstrated that participants experienced on
average "8" largest losses ($ -1250) with deck B, but did
not enter the "hunch" phase of Damasio [1]. That is, even
when experiencing double trials with large losses ($ -
1250), the somatic marker system cannot prevent partici-
pants from choosing the disadvantageous deck B in the
IGT. Obviously, the long-term outcome can interpret the
result of the AACC version but not that of the BBDD ver-
sion. This experimental result supports the "prominent
deck B" phenomenon [7,29-33], and contradicts the basic
IGT assumption.
Next, this study attempted to determine which variable
can explain the "prominent deck B" phenomenon. After
carefully reexamining the original structure of the IGT,
this study proposes that high-frequency gain is the most
plausible cause of participant preferences in the simple
version IGT. In fact, if we summarized the value of "earn
and pay" in each trial of IGT, the gain-loss structure
between advantageous and disadvantageous decks
becomes unbalanced (see Table 3); for example, the first
ten-trial session of the IGT, deck A contains five gains and
five losses, deck B contains nine gains and one loss, deck
C contains five gains and five "standoffs", and deck D con-
tains nine gains and one loss. Deck C obviously has better
long-term outcome and gain-loss frequency than deck A.
The gain-loss frequency and long-term outcome thus can
be used to interpret the experimental results for the AACC.
On the other hand, decks B and D possessed the same
gain-loss frequency (9 gains and 1 loss) but the inverse
long-term outcome. According to the Table 3, the internal
structure is unbalanced for gain-loss frequency between
the advantageous and disadvantageous decks. Decks B, C,
and D have a relatively high-frequency gain and low-fre-
quency loss. Thus, it is not strange that some studies show
that participants prefer the disadvantageous deck B in the
IGT. The present study results identified that decision
makers selected decks B and D with equal frequency.
Gain-loss frequency coincides closely with the results of
AACC and BBDD. In contrast, long-term outcome can
only interpret the results of the AACC version but not of
the BBDD version.
Actually, deck B is an important index for interpreting the
effect of impulse inhibition of ventromedial prefrontal
function. In the proposal of Damasio and Bechara, deck B
possesses a relatively large loss ($ -1250) among the four
decks and negative long-term outcomes in IGT, and thus
normal decision makers should be inhibited from select-
ing deck B owing to a small number of trials involving
large losses. The basic assumption of IGT is that the largest
loss can induce the robust alarm signal from the intact
somatic system, guiding decision processing and inhibit-
Participant memory assessments in the simplified IGT Figure 6
Participant memory assessments in the simplified 
IGT. Following stage 1, the two groups (AACC and BBDD) 
of participants were required to answer the following ques-
tion: Please recall how many trials you assigned for these decks in 
total 100 trials" and most participants correctly recalled the 
number of cards chosen during the first stage, indicating that 
they have a vivid memory of each deck and that participants 
preferred deck C to deck A and preferred deck B as often as 
deck D.
Table 2: The final state of monetary gain-loss in the simplified IGT.
AACC BBDD
Final state of gain-loss Mean ($) SD Mean ($) SD
Session 1 +539.58 722.76 -491.66 928.14
Session 2 +1319.79 1188.28 -575.00 963.91Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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ing further selection of deck B. However, this study and
some research groups [7,29-33] have indicated that the
choice behavior of most participants is dominated by the
high-frequency gain of deck B, rather than inhibited by
the large loss of deck B. SMH argued that participants
enter the "hunch" stage during the late period of IGT, and
thus deck B was selected more frequently than the other
decks. Supposing SMH is correct, a descending learning-
curve should exist for deck B. However, this study demon-
strated that participants seemed to prefer deck B through-
out the game. Particularly, a descending learning-curve
was not observed during either the first or the second ses-
sions of 100 trials (See Figure 5).
Gain-loss frequency [34] as a powerful guiding factor in
IGT and implies that decision makers can apply a "win-
stay, lose-shift" strategy [34-39] when making decisions
and coping with uncertain situations. Gains from the pre-
vious trial increased the probability of choosing the same
deck, and immediate loss reduced the probability of
remaining at the same deck [34]. Therefore, the choice
pattern can be consistent with the variable, namely the
gain-loss frequency. After reviewing the decision-making
literature [40-43] and affective neuroscience [44-46], the
above findings and some arguments of SMH also indi-
cated that immediate gain and loss dominate choice
behavior, particularly with the loading of emotion prop-
erty; the results for the BBDD version thus may not be an
isolated finding. Furthermore, these studies concluded
that decision-makers are shortsighted, even in situations
with high certainty [47].
At first glance, the difference between decks A and C
results from the manipulation of long-term outcome.
Careful analysis of the sum of gains and losses for each
trial determined that deck A contains 5 gains and 5 losses,
and deck C contains 5 gains and 5 "standoffs" (See Table
3). Decks A and C contain 5 gains, but deck C has 5
"standoffs" and thus is superior to deck A in the loss-fre-
quency domain. Summarizing the results of two simple
versions of the IGT, it can be concluded that gain-loss fre-
quency rather than long-term outcome is the main guid-
ing factor under uncertainty. This study identifies a
divisive phenomenon of deck B inside the IGT [7,29-
34,48].
IGT is the core task in constructing the SMH, suggesting
that the physiological bodily feedback (Body loop) or
affective brain system (As if loop), particularly the medial
frontal cortex, plays a role in making long-term beneficial
decisions. The SMH provided the affective brain system
with a new role in making "rational" decisions, very dif-
ferent from other affective theories [5,44,45]. Supposing
the finding of original IGT applies, this suggests that the
affective system can be simulated to an internal bank
which operated precisely for the long-term calculation
implicitly. However, some evidence was used by the IGT
to point out the instability of bodily feedback [26,49] and
somatic system [25,30,50] on the physiological level. On
the other hand, if the "prominent deck B" phenomenon
always occurs, this implies that the influence of high-fre-
quency monetary rewards can exceed that of high-inten-
sity punishment under uncertainty. To summarize, the
argument of SMH should be carefully reconsidered on
both the physiological and task levels.
Conclusion
Notably, IGT has been utilized for many neurological and
psychiatric assessments. The present experiment utilized
the simple version of the IGT to observe changes in partic-
ipant preferences by separating high-frequency gain decks
(B, D) from low-frequency gain decks (A, C) in two-stage
Table 3: The immediate net value of each trial in the original IGT.
Deck
Card Sequence
ABCD
11 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
21 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
3 -50 100 0 50
41 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
5 -200 100 0 50
61 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
7 -100 100 0 50
81 0 0 1 0 0 5 05 0
9 -150 -1150 05 0
10 -250 100 0 -200
Final Outcomes -250 ($) -250 ($) +250 ($) +250 ($)
Gain-loss Frequency 5 gains
5 losses
9 gains
1 loss
5 gains
5 draws
9 gains
1 lossBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:16 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/16
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games. The AACC version confirmed the result of the orig-
inal finding of IGT. Nevertheless, the experimental result
for the BBDD version verified the phenomenon of "prom-
inent deck B", which is incongruent with the basic
assumption of the IGT. The largest loss in deck B did not
prevent participants from selecting this bad final-outcome
deck. However, the high-frequency loss of deck A can pre-
vent this choice being made. We propose that gain-loss
frequency can be used to interpret the deck B phenome-
non. This work concluded that these "prominent deck B"
studies [7,29-34] were not an isolated finding, and the
gain-loss frequency rather than long-term outcome could
predict participant preferences in these similar gambling
tasks. Participant preference for the high-frequency gain
deck B had two implications. First, the largest loss did not
inhibit normal decision makers from choosing disadvan-
tageous deck B; second, the bad long-term outcome did
not trigger participant avoidance of deck B under uncer-
tainty.
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